CVE-2025-15712 is a Stored Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in Live Composer before version 2.1.24. The plugin, a drag-and-drop page builder installed on more than 10,000 sites with over 1.6 million all-time downloads, does not sanitize and escape its staff member settings — the social profile links of a staff member are echoed straight into href attributes, and the staff position and module labels are printed raw. A high-privilege user, an Administrator working in the page builder, can store a payload in the staff form that runs in the browser of every visitor who opens the page — up to full administrator account takeover. It matters on WordPress Multisite and on sites with DISALLOW_UNFILTERED_HTML, where administrators are not allowed to post raw HTML. The issue is fixed in 2.1.24.

CVE CVE-2025-15712
Plugin Version Live Composer < 2.1.24, fixed in 2.1.24
All Time 1 652 332
Active installations 10 000+
Publicly Published November 9, 2026
Last Updated November 11, 2026
Researcher Krugov Artyom
CWE CWE-79 Cross-Site Scripting
PoC Yes
Exploit No
Reference https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-15712
https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/00d2c75d-7e8f-4f6c-8b72-c66b1bb6cc59/
Plugin Security Certification by CleanTalk Not safe
Logo of the plugin Live Composer plugin logo

Timeline

27 June, 2025 Plugin testing and vulnerability detection in Live Composer were completed; the vulnerability report was sent with the PoC, technical description, and recommendations for remediation.
November 6, 2026 The vendor released version 2.1.24, escaping the link, text, icon, target and inline SVG fields of the Social, Staff, Staff Social, Icon and Button modules to prevent stored XSS via crafted module data.
November 9, 2026 WPScan publicly published the advisory.
November 11, 2026 The CVE record was published in the CVE registry.

Discovery of the Vulnerability

Live Composer ships a Staff post type for team members, and a Staff module that renders them on a page with their photo, position and social icons. I found that the social profile link of a staff member — Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, Google+, LinkedIn or Email, stored in the staff entry (post meta such as dslc_staff_social_twitter) — is printed straight into the link attribute: <a target="…" href="<?php echo $social_twitter; ?>"> in modules/staff/module.php, while the staff position and the module’s own heading, view-all link and filter labels are echoed the same raw way, with no sanitizing on input and no escaping on output. The settings are stored in the database together with the staff entry and the page, so the payload is served to every visitor of every page that displays the staff member. A value that closes the attribute with a quote can therefore inject new HTML of its own, including script-capable elements — a persistent (Stored) XSS. In 2.1.24 the vendor wraps the social links in esc_url(), the position and text fields in esc_html(), and the surrounding attributes in esc_attr().

Understanding of Stored Cross-Site Scripting attacks

Stored (persistent) Cross-Site Scripting keeps the attacker’s payload on the server so it is served automatically to whoever opens the affected page. This case needs a high-privilege account — the page builder is operated by administrators — which is why the issue is rated Low (CVSS 3.5): on a standard single site an administrator already holds the unfiltered_html capability and can post raw HTML anyway. The risk becomes real on WordPress Multisite and on sites that set DISALLOW_UNFILTERED_HTML, where administrators do not hold it: missing output escaping lets them bypass that restriction and run JavaScript in the context of the site.

The payload does not stay inside the editing screen. The poisoned module is printed on the public front end of the page, so the injected code runs for every visitor — and, most importantly, for every administrator who opens or edits that page in Live Composer, which opens the way to session hijacking and full account takeover.

Exploiting the Stored Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability

To reproduce the vulnerability on an affected version (below 2.1.24):

  • Use a site where administrators cannot post raw HTML: WordPress Multisite, or a single site with DISALLOW_UNFILTERED_HTML set to true.
  • Log in as an Administrator and open the target page.
  • Click Edit to launch the Live Composer front-end editor.
  • In Elements, select the Staff module and add it to the page.
  • Insert the XSS payload into a staff member social form field — Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn or Email — and save.
  • Open the page on the front end — the stored payload breaks out of the social link and executes for every visitor.

PoC:

POC:
Account - Administrator, on a site where administrators cannot post raw HTML
(WordPress Multisite, or DISALLOW_UNFILTERED_HTML set to true)

1) Open the target page and click Edit to launch the Live Composer front-end editor.
2) In Elements, select the Staff module and add it to the page (with a staff member that
   shows social icons).
3) Insert the payload below into one of the staff member social form fields - Twitter,
   Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn or Email:
   "><script></script><img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>
4) Save and open the page on the front end: the payload closes the href attribute of the
   social icon link, and the onerror handler executes alert(document.domain) in the
   browser of every visitor of the page.

The payload closes the href attribute and the link tag with ">, the empty <script></script> shows that arbitrary markup can be planted, and <img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)> fires as soon as the browser fails to load the non-existent image — no interaction beyond opening the page is needed. In a real attack the harmless alert(document.domain) would be replaced with code that steals the administrator’s session cookie or silently creates a rogue administrator, and it would fire for every visitor, including every administrator who opens or edits the page in Live Composer — stored XSS on behalf of the administrator that ends in account takeover.

Recommendations for Improved Security

To mitigate CVE-2025-15712:

  • Update the plugin to version 2.1.24 or later. The 2.1.24 changelog states that the vendor now escapes “the link, text, icon, target and inline SVG fields of the Social, Staff, Staff Social, Icon and Button modules … to prevent stored XSS via crafted module data” — in the Staff module specifically, the staff social links are passed through esc_url(), the position and text fields through esc_html(), and the surrounding attributes through esc_attr().
  • Sanitize module settings on input and escape them on output. A profile URL is a URL and should always be printed through esc_url(), plain-text fields through esc_html() — never echoed as free-form HTML.
  • Do not treat the administrator role as a trust boundary for HTML, especially on Multisite and with DISALLOW_UNFILTERED_HTML.
  • Review which roles can open pages in the Live Composer editor, and protect those accounts with 2FA.
  • Implement a strong Content Security Policy (CSP) to block inline JavaScript execution.
  • Deploy a Web Application Firewall to filter XSS payloads before they reach the application.

To prevent this type of attack, follow our methods of XSS prevention.

By addressing Stored XSS vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-15712 early, WordPress site owners and plugin developers can keep public pages — not only admin screens — free of injected scripts. Stay vigilant, stay secure.

#WordPressSecurity #StoredXSS #LiveComposer #WebsiteSafety #StayProtected

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Krugov Artyom

CVE-2025-15712 – Live Composer – Stored XSS via Staff – POC

Artyom Krugov

Cybersecurity Specialist with 4 years of hands-on experience in web application and WordPress security. Holder of the OSCP+ certification and author of 80+ publicly disclosed CVEs affecting WordPress plugins and themes. Specialized in vulnerability research, penetration testing, website incident response, malware removal, and security hardening of production environments. Experienced in identifying and validating high-impact vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins, themes, and custom web applications, as well as providing practical remediation guidance to improve overall security posture. Strong background in web application security, source code review, vulnerability assessment, exploit validation, and post-compromise recovery of infected websites.

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